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I. INTRODUCTION

The music industry has changed in the last century, and so has
copyright.' Music used to be about compositions, sheet music, and public
performances for profit.2 Copyright law protected musical compositions
but provided no protection for recordings. Even compositions were subject
to a compulsory license that allowed others to pay for the right to perform
or record the work.3 It was 1971 before Congress provided copyright
protection for recordings themselves, and even then protection was more
limited than virtually all other forms of copyright.4 The music business
flourished in those times.'
When digital copying came along, the industry should have felt
uneasy.6 Digital copies are not only perfect in quality, but quickly and
easily produced.7 The Internet, or rapid file sharing, then became a reality
Soon, information could be retrieved from anywhere in the world using the

1. David L. Lange, Students, Music andthe Net: A Comment on Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing,
2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 21, *3.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id. at *4.
6. Lange, supra note 1, at *5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Internet. 9 Then came high speed Internet connections and file compression
technologies such as MP3.' ° Suddenly it was very easy to transfer large
files across the Internet in a short time.
The online music file sharing industry was born as Napster took
advantage of these advances in technology.1' Napster's system allowed
anyone with a connection to the Internet the ability to share files, such as
specifically compressed music files in MP3 format, with anyone in the
world. 2 With a growing number of users, Napster became the popular way
to share music without paying for it. 3 The recording industry took note
and filed suit. 4 The industry won the case against Napster on a theory of
indirect copyright infringement. 5 That decision was based heavily upon
the fact that Napster used a centralized network architecture giving it
control over its users.' 6 Therefore, when KaZaa, a new online file sharing
system with a non-centralized architecture that did not allow user control
was created, the recording industry lost the next case. 7
Afterwards, the recording industry lost an opportunity to become a
commercial partner in the domain of online music file sharing by failing
to license the Napster technology. With Napster's centralized file sharing
architecture, the recording industry's online distribution of music could
have become the preferred method for online music file sharing. The
centralized server Napster model would have provided the best security
and control for the music industry in the online distribution of music files.
The snowball effect of licensing Napster would have made other
technologies unattractive to file sharing users. In addition, file sharing
users were already familiar with the look and feel of the Napster software.
Instead, the recording industry won the battle against Napster but lost
the file sharing war. The failure to license Napster while demanding an
injunction spawned new methods of online file sharing. KaZaa and the
fully distributed network architecture, pure peer-to-peer (P2P), became the
pervasive architecture for online file sharing in the absence of Napster1

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1022.
16. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
17. See generally Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d
1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Goes
18. Seagrum Smith, FromNapstertoKaZaa:The Battle overPeer-To-PeerFilesharing
International,2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 8, * !-*2.
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Unfortunately for the recording industry, courts did not view the P2P
network architecture in the same way as Napster's centralized network
architecture (hybrid P2P), and consequently found the developers of the
KaZaa technology not liable for copyright infringement.' 9 Thus, the
recording industry lost the war against KaZaa and today is forced to ferret
out file-sharing individuals. Meanwhile, sales of new compact discs (CDs)
are down in the last three years, since Napster came onto the scene, and the
music industry is struggling.20 Profits would not be down if the recording
industry would have only licensed Napster and thus made it the preferred
and legitimate file sharing technology.
Thus, the industry must now consider what solutions remain. The
industry could find a way to come together and license all their
copyrighted music works in a bundle through a compulsory licensing
agreement. If continued, the current suits against selected direct infringers
may prove to alienate the industry's own customers. Another solution
might be to pursue some technological protection that prevents users from
violating copyright laws. Education of music consumers on the
repercussions of file sharing would help. Cooperation with colleges could
also be very effective, since music file sharing was born there.
Part II of this Article gives the background of the relevant copyright
law and file sharing. The state and history of the law before Napster, after
Napster, and up to and including Grokster (KaZaa) are discussed. Part III
of this Article discusses the possible solutions for the recording industry.
Possible solutions include licensing schemes, suits against direct
infringers, and technological protections, consumer education, and
cooperation with universities.
II. BACKGROUND
It all started with the Internet.2 ' With a stated goal and architecture
supporting the easy transfer of files across a world wide network, Internet
file sharing was born. 22 The history of file sharing and copyright law began
before the proliferation of personal computers and computer networks in
the early 1990s. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court found the manufacturer
19. See Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073.
20. Lange, supra note 1, at *5.
21. See generally Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. The Internet was spawned with the idea of
sharing information between universities and government through the implementation of one large
network connecting all such organizations. See DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH
TCP/IP § 1.4 (2d ed. 1991).
22. See generallyNapster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
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of a video cassette recorder, Sony, not liable for copyright infringement
under a theory of secondary liability or indirect infringement.23 In 1996,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a swap meet24
operator liable for indirect copyright infringement associated with the sale
of unauthorized sound recordings or bootlegged tapes.2
In 1999, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the creator
and operator of a music file sharing system, Napster, Inc., secondarily
liable for the copyright infringing activities of Napster's users.26 In the
summer of 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California found other file sharing system operators, including Grokster
and KaZaa, not secondarily liable for the file sharing activities of their
users based on a significant difference in the architecture of the Grokster
file sharing system as compared to the Napster system.27 Having lost the
Grokster case, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
initiated copyright lawsuits against the direct infringers, everyday file
swappers.28
A. Copyright Law and File SharingBefore Napster
The Sony case is often cited in the history of copyright law and file
sharing. For the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a theory of
indirect infringement in the analysis of alleged copyright infringement
through the sale of a device capable of recording audiovisual works.29
After Sony, the Fonovisacourt further clarified the two theories of indirect
infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious infringement, in the
copyright infringement analysis of bootlegged tape sales at a swap meet.3"

23. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,455 (1984). The theory
of secondary liability or indirect infringement is based on the agency principles of respondeat
superior where the principal is held responsible for the acts of the agent. See Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996). In the copyright arena, the provider of
technology that enables direct copyright infringement may be held liable for indirect copyright
infringement. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
24. A swap meet or flea market is a place where customers purchase various merchandise
from individual vendors. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
25. Id. at 264.
26. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
27. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
28. See Jennifer Norman, StayingAlive: Can the Recording IndustrySurvive Peer-to-Peer?,
26 CoLum. J.L. & ARTS 371, 392 (2003).
29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).
30. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996).
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1. Sony
In Sony, the movie and television industry sued to enjoin Sony from
selling the video tape recorder (VTR).3 The movie industry argued that
users of the VTR, who used it to record live broadcasts or movies, violated
the exclusive right of copyright owners to reproduce their copyrighted
movies or television shows.3 2 Sony was therefore liable under theories of
either contributory infringement or vicarious infringement, because Sony
sold the device making the reproduction possible, according to the movie
industry.33 The Sony Court, however, held that because the VTR was
capable of significant non-infringing uses, Sony could not be liable under
either theory of indirect infringement.34
The Sony Court reasoned that a substantial number of copyright holders
would not have objected to common practice of "time shifting" by VTR
users.35 Time shifting refers to the practice of recording a live television
broadcast for the purpose of watching it later.36 Most copyright holders in
such television programs had no objection because the time shifting
enlarged their viewing audience and had no effect on the commercial value
of their copyrights.3 7 Thus, the Sony Court found that the VTR was capable

of substantial non-infringing uses.3" Consequently, the manufacturer of
new technology will not be held indirectly liable when the technology is
capable of significant non-infringing uses.39

2. Fonovisa
In Fonovisa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified
the concepts of vicarious and contributory infringement as applied to

31. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
32. Id.
33. Id. The exclusive rights of copyright owners include the rights (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of audio
transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004).
34. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
35. Id. at 421.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
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copyright law.4" The Fonovisa court found the operators of a swap meet
or flea market liable for the sale of counterfeit copyrighted recordings, in
the form of bootlegged tapes, by vendors who rented space in the swap
meet.4 ' Swap meet vendors paid daily rental fees and customers paid
admission fees.42 Under either theory of indirect infringement, a plaintiff
must first show direct infringement.43 In this case, direct infringement was
obvious, since vendors had made counterfeit recordings and sold them to
the public. 44
a. Vicarious Infringement
Vicarious infringement is found when a defendant has a right to control
the infringing activity and a financial interest in such activity.45 The
Fonovisa court found vicarious infringement where the operator had a
right to control the vendors and received a financial benefit from the sale
of bootlegged tapes.46 Operators had a right to control since they patrolled
the premises, removed unwanted vendors, and controlled the access of
customers.47 Operators received a financial benefit in the form of daily
rental fees, customer admission fees, and incidental payments for parking
and food where the counterfeit recordings acted as a draw for swap meet
customers.48
b. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement is found when a defendant has knowledge
of direct infringement and materially contributed to the infringement.49
The Fonovisacourt found contributory infringement where the swap meet
operators had knowledge of the bootlegged tape sales and materially
contributed to those sales.5" Operators had knowledge since police raided
40. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260-64 (9th Cir. 1996).
41. See id. at 264. The swap meet is a place where customers purchase various merchandise
from individual vendors. Id. at 261.
42. Id. at 261.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
46. Id. at 262-64. The Fonovisacourt noted that vicarious copyright infringement or liability
is derived from the agency principles of respondeat superior. Id. at 264.
47. Id. at 262-63. However, operators failed to remove the infringing vendors. Id.
48. Id. at 263-64.
49. See id. at 264.
50. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
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the swap meet and seized counterfeit recordings prior to the lawsuit.5
Operators materially contributed when they provided support services52 to
vendors and failed to identify the infringing vendors upon request by
police.53
B. Napster
In Napster, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the
creator and operator of a revolutionary music file sharing system, Napster,
Inc., liable for both contributory and vicarious infringement of copyrights
in various music recordings. 4 Napster's music file sharing system took
advantage of a number of technological advancements relating to the
transfer of files over the Internet.55
1. Overview of Advances in Technology and File Sharing Software
Today, advances in digital technology allow perfect copies of a
copyrighted musical work to be quickly reproduced.56 Music is commonly
distributed via audio compact discs (CDs) containing relatively large
digital audio files. 57 Advances in digital file compression, such as MP3,
allow the compression of the CD audio files into much smaller MP3
files. 5' The compressed MP3 files use much less computer memory and are
therefore easier to upload or download from the Internet. 59 Although the
MP3 compression causes some minimal loss in sound quality, the format
is popular because of the ease of use in file transfer over the Internet.6°
High-bandwidth connections to the Internet have also increased the ease
with which users may transfer or share files over the Internet.6 '

51. Id. The police had not only raided the swap meet and seized over 38,000 bootlegged
tapes, but later sent a letter notifying the operators that such sales had not been discontinued. Id.
at 261.
52. The Fonovisacourt mentioned booth spaces, utilities, parking, and advertising as support
services. Id. at 264.
53. Id.
54. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs were copyright owners of various musical recordings. Id. at 1010-11.
55. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
56. Norman, supra note 28, at 373.
57. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Norman, supra note 28, at 373.
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A user who wants to share music may obtain MP3 files by either
"ripping" a CD, the process of compressing CD audio files into MP3 files,
or by downloading shared MP3 files, that have already been ripped, from
the Internet through the use of file sharing software.6 2 Once the user has
some MP3 files stored on his hard drive, he may allow other users to
download his stored MP3 files through the use of the file sharing
software.63 To find music files, a user will initiate a search of the file
sharing system.64 Once the search is complete, a list of files matching the
user's search criteria, like "Beatles," is returned.65 The user then selects
which song or MP3 music file he wants and the download begins.66 When
the user selects a file to download, the Napster service communicates the
hosts Internet address to his computer; this information allows him to
connect with the host user in order to download the file.67 In this
arrangement, the host is the computer from which the desired file is
6" Often, users may also engage in chat or browse each others
downloaded.
69
files.
MP3
Before the introduction of high speed broadband Internet connections,
users logged onto the Internet via slow dial-up connections.7 ° The transfer
or sharing of files over these slow connections could take a very long
time.7 However, with both MP3 compression and the growing popularity
of fast broadband connections, the amount of time required for file sharing
was dramatically
reduced.72 As a result, music file sharing took off with
73
Napster.

2. Napster's Technology
Napster, Inc. distributed MusicShare74 software to its users for free
download from the Napster web site.75 The free file sharing software

62. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norman, supra note 28, at 373.
Id.
See id. at 375.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Norman, supra note 28, at 373.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); A&M Records,

Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

74. MusicShare is Napster's proprietary file sharing software. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
75. Id.
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allowed a user to make available MP3 music files, on the hard drive of the
user's personal computer (PC), for download by other Napster users who
were also logged-on the system.76 The MusicShare software also allowed
a Napster user to perform a search of the system to find MP3 files on
another user's PCs." The searching user can then download those files via
the Internet to his own PC hard drive for his personal use.7" Most of the
files shared on the Napster system were copyrighted musical works, yet
Napster did not prevent the sharing of such copyrighted works.7 9
In order for a Napster user to share MP3 files, he had to designate a
"user library" directory on the hard drive of his PC. 0 Then he logged onto
the Napster system using a user name and password. The Napster system
then validated all MP3 files in the user library directory by checking to see
that the files met MP3 format requirements.8 2 If the MP3 files in the user
library met validity requirements, then Napster servers stored the user
designated filenames in a list of available MP3 files. 3 The actual stored
MP3 files remained on the user's PC, while the list of available files
remained on Napster's servers."
The Napster system operated as a hybrid P2P network. 5 Napster's
centralized servers facilitated a Napster user's search of the system. 6
Without Napster's centralized servers allowing user searches, Napster
users would not be able to share files and the system would not work. 7 In
contrast, a pure P2P network would not require the services of a
centralized server to facilitate any file transfer or sharing. 8

76. See id. at 1011-12.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902-03 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(finding that "virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted files and that the vast
majority of the music available on Napster is copyrighted.").
80. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
81. Id at 1012.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Mathias Strasser, Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a Changing
Internet Architecture, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 660, 694-97 (2001).
86. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
87. See id.
88. See Strasser, supra note 85, at 696-97.

20041
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3. Fair Use
As a defense to the allegation of direct infringement, Napster argued
that its users were engaged in fair use of the copyrighted works. 9 Napster
argued that its users were simply space-shifting music they already owned,
or sampling music that they intended to purchase.90 Space-shifting refers
to the process of converting a CD the consumer already owns into MP3
format and using Napster to transfer the music to a different computer from home to office, for example. 9 Napster argued that space-shifting was
akin to time-shifting in Sony.92 Napster argued that because these uses
amounted to fair use, there was no direct or indirect infringement.93
In order to analyze fair use, the Napster court considered the four
statutory factors: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the work or the value of the work.94 The Napster court found
that downloading MP3 files did not transform the nature of the
copyrighted work, that the use was commercial because users "get for free
something they would ordinarily have to buy," that users engaged in
wholesale copying, and that this copying caused harm to the legitimate
online distribution market.95
The Napster court also reasoned that Napster did not really offer a
sampling service, because its users obtained a complete copy of a
particular song and were able to keep the copy whether or not they
purchased the album later.9 6 The space-shifting argument was discredited
when a survey showed that most Napster users did not own the music they
downloaded.9 7 The Napster court refused to extend the Sony doctrine
because Napster users did not primarily use the service for noninfringing

89. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. The fair use factors are listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the "amount
and substantiality of the portion used" in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for the work or the value of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
90. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
91. See id at 1019.
92. Id. at 1014; see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,912 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
93. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
95. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13.
96. Id. at 913-14.
97. Id. at916.
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uses. 9s Having rejected Napster's fair use defense, the Napster court
considered claims of contributory and vicarious infringement.99
4. Vicarious Infringement
Plaintiffs, who were copyright owners of various music recordings
(recording industry), brought suit against Napster for vicarious
infringement."° The recording industry alleged that Napster had a right to
control its file sharing system and had a financial interest in operating the
system.'0 ' The recording industry argued that Napster's users directly
infringed the copyrights it held by violating at least one of the exclusive
rights granted under section 106 of the Copyright Act.'0 2
The Napster court reasoned that Napster could have blocked the
infringing users, but failed to enforce their own stated policy. 03
' The policy
allowed Napster to refuse service to any user who violated the law.'" 4
Thus, the Napster court found that Napster had the right to control, but
noted that such control was limited to the search index.'0 5 The Napster
court also reasoned that because Napster derived significant advertising
revenue directly from increases in its userbase, Napster had a financial
interest in increasing the number of users, who were primarily sharing
copyrighted files.0 6

98. Id.
99. Id. at 918-23.
100. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001);
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920-22.
101. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-23.
102. Id. Exclusive rights include the right (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or othertransfer of ownership;
(4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6)
to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004).
103. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
104. Id. The Napster court said that to escape vicarious liability, the right to control must be
vigorously exercised to stop infringement. Id. Napster had an express reservation of rights policy
that allowed Napster to refuse service to any user for any reason. Id.
105. Id. The Napster court also reasoned that defendants were limited in boundaries of control
by their current system architecture. Id.
106. Id. at 1023.
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5. Contributory Infringement
Plaintiffs also brought suit against Napster for contributory
infringement. 10 7 The recording industry alleged that Napster had
knowledge of the direct infringement of their copyrights and had
materially contributed to the direct infringement.'08 The Napster court
reasoned that Napster had actual and constructive knowledge of the
sharing of copyrighted files because the recording industry had informed
them of the presence of copyrighted files on the Napster system.'09 Also,
a document written by a Napster company officer acknowledged that users
were sharing copyrighted files." 0 The Napster court concluded that
Napster materially contributed to the sharing of copyrighted files since,
without Napster's centralized searching index, users could not find and
download copyrighted music."' The material contribution element
depended heavily on the centralized architecture of the Napster system."12
6. Further Litigation
After the Napster litigation and injunction, the RIAA engaged in
licensing negotiations with Napster. 13 However, no acceptable agreement
was ever reached, and the recording industry ended up spawning its own
file sharing endeavor, MusicNet, that was later investigated by the U.S.
Department of Justice for antitrust violations.' "' MusicNet engaged in a

107. See id. at 1019-22; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918-20
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
108. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-22.
109. Id.at 1020.
110. Id. at 1020 n.5. The Napster court found that Napster had actual knowledge because: (1)
a document authorized by a Napster, Inc. co-founder mentioned a need to remain ignorant of users'
real names and IP addresses because the users were exchanging pirated music; and (2) the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) had informed Napster of more than 12,000
infringing files on the Napster system. Id. The Napster court found that Napster had constructive
knowledge of the direct infringement because: (1) Napster's executives had recording industry
experience; (2) Napster had enforced intellectual property rights in other instances; (3) Napster's
executives had downloaded copyrighted songs by using the Napster system; and (4) Napster had
promoted the Napster web site using infringing files. Id. The Napster court further reasoned that
the system's capability of significant non-infringing uses does not overcome the actual knowledge
Napster possessed. See id. at 1021. However, the Napster court also found that knowledge may not
be assumed solely because the system is capable of infringing uses. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 102 122.
111. Id.at 1022.
112. Id.
113. Norman, supra note 28, at 381.
114. Id.at 382.
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licensing agreement with Napster." 5 However, Napster later argued the
licensing agreement to be unduly restrictive and a misuse of the RIAA's
copyrights."1 6 The courts agreed somewhat, but before Napster could
pursue further litigation, it filed for bankruptcy."1 7
7. Advantages of Napster for the RIAA
The recording industry seemed to forget about all the advantages of
licensing to Napster, and failed to make it happen. The Napster centralized
index provided some control over the transfer or sharing of MP3 files. If
the recording industry ever wanted to implement substantial control over
the file sharing process, Napster's centralized server architecture could
allow that control. For example, the recording industry might want to limit
the number of times a user could share a particular song.
Napster had a broad user base consisting of millions of users. The
recording industry would not have to start from scratch to develop a user
base or new software. The Napster software was already user tested and
had achieved "mindshare." Mindshare occurs when a user has become so
comfortable with the look and feel of a software application that the use
of the application becomes second nature." 8 The product that gets to the
software market first has the distinct advantage of achieving mindshare
before any other product. Consequently, software users may tend to expect
the software in a given market to have the look and feel of the first product
to hit the market. Most software analysts would agree that this is a
tremendous advantage. By failing to license Napster, the recording
industry lost out on this tremendous advantage and the opportunity to
become the dominant supplier of the initial market.
C. Grokster
In Grokster,'19 the recording industry brought suit against three new file
sharing software services, Grokster, Streamcast Networks, and KaZaa
(Grokster). 2 ° Grokster's file sharing services were based on the FastTrack

115. Id.
116. Id. at 382-83.
117. Id. at383.
118. See Tom R. HalThill, Tom's Computer Dictionary (2004), at http://www.halfhill.com/
terms.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
119. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
120. Id. at 1031.
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networking technology, a pure P2P architecture.12' The recording industry
alleged that FastTrack technology had been designed simply to overcome
the Napster decision and to fill the void left by Napster's apparent
demise. 122 The recording industry alleged Grokster to be liable for the
copyright infringement by users of their file sharing software under
theories of both vicarious and contributory infringement. 123 Defendant
KaZaa claimed it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. District
Grokster court
Court for the Central District of California.'24 However, 2the
5
disagreed and KaZaa's motion to dismiss was denied.
After finding jurisdiction, the analysis of the Grokster court closely
followed the indirect copyright infringement analysis for file sharing
software established in Napster.26 As with all claims of contributory and
vicarious liability, the Grokster court first considered whether Grokster's
users had directly infringed the copyrights of the recording industry.'27
After finding direct infringement, the GroksterCourt applied the tests of
contributory and vicarious infringement, while considering the new
2
completely distributed or pure P2P architecture of the Grokster system.1'
1. Jurisdiction and Enforcement
The Grokster court denied KaZaa's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue,
and forum non conveniens' 29 Prior to the case, KaZaa transferred
ownership of key assets, including its Kazaa.com web site and its software,
from its Netherlands corporation to Sharman, a "company organized under
the laws of the island-nation of Vanatu and doing business principally in
Australia."' 130 Despite this maneuver by KaZaa, the Grokster court held
that the recording industry had satisfied its burden for specific

121. Id. at 1031-32.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal.
2003). However, in the recent decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, a
default judgment was entered against KaZaa who failed to defend the action. Grokster, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 1029. Therefore, no opinion was entered as to the service's potential liability in the
United States.
125. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
126. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-46.
127. Id. at 1034-35.
128. Id. at 1035-46.
129. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
130. Id. at 1080.
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jurisdiction.' KaZaa was found to have numerous contacts within the
state of California, including providing software and end-user license
agreements to at least two million California residents. 32
' Thus, KaZaa was
unable to escape the jurisdiction of the California district court.'33
Although the Grokster court did not have to consider it, enforcement
of the requested injunction would have been very difficult.'34 Given that
KaZaa, along with other offshore P2P software providers tend to scatter
their assets outside the United States, it would be very difficult for a U.S.
court to find domestic assets to seize.135 Even if a court ordered a shut
down of an infringing site, making that happen might be next to
impossible.' 36 Where domestic assets are not available to use as
negotiating collateral, shutting down a foreign based P2P software
provider would almost certainly have to involve cooperation from the
P2P's home country.'37 However, when the home country does not see a
problem with the P2Ps activities, such as KaZaa, then getting such
cooperation is unlikely. 3 ' The U.S. government may even be reluctant to
lobby on behalf of the recording industry, as the federal government has
been under some pressure from certain powerful technology companies,
including Apple Computer, Microsoft, Dell Computer, Cisco Systems,
Hewlett-Packard, and Intel, that are upset with what they see as the
recording industry's attempt to control the progress of technology.'39
2. Grokster System Architecture
After establishing jurisdiction, the Grokster court analyzed the
Grokster system architecture. The Grokster court noted that Grokster' s file
sharing system architecture 4 ° allowed operation ofthe system without any

131. Specificjurisdiction is reasonably found where: "1) a nonresident defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the
protections of its laws; and 2) the plaintiff's claims arise out of the defendants' forum-related
activities." Id. at 1084.
132. Id. at 1087-88.
133. Id. at 1100.
134. Smith, supra note 18, at *10-*12.
135. Id at*10.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Declan McCullagh, Tech FirmsFightCopy-ProtectionLaws, CNETNEwS.COM, Jan.
23, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2102-1023-981882.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
140. The system architecture was a pure peer-to-peer network without centralized file servers.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-32 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
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centralized file servers. 4 ' The Grokster court further observed that without
the necessity for centralized file servers, Grokster's users operated the
system completely independent of Grokster.'42 Grokster's users, therefore,
needed no assistance after143downloading Grokster's free user software to
transfer MP3 music files.
The Grokster court also noted subtle differences in the origin and
operation of the defendants' file sharing systems.' 44 The Grokster court
found that all three defendants, Grokster, KaZaa BV, and StreamCast,
45
distributed software originally based upon FastTrack technology.
However, defendant StreamCast's file sharing software now employs the
"open" or non-proprietary Gnutella technology. 46 Defendant Grokster
47
continued to employ the proprietary FastTrack technology.
3. Contributory Infringement
After the Grokster court considered the Grokster's system architecture
and origin, it addressed the contributory infringement claim. 48 The
Grokster court found that defendants had knowledge of the infringing
activities of their users but had not materially contributed to the infringing
activities. 49 Unlike Napster, who provided the "site and facilities" in the
form of centralized file servers, Grokster's system operated without any
such facilities. 5 ' Thus, the Grokster court considered that while enjoining
Napster would prevent further file sharing in the Napster system, enjoining
defendants would not stop file sharing on Grokster system.'' Thus, the
Grokster court concluded that the defendants were not liable for
contributory infringement.' 52

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1032.
145. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. The FastTrack technology was developed by
defendants Niklas Zennstrom and Janus Friis, who launched KaZaa BV. Id. FastTrack was then
licensed to KaZaa BV, Grokster, and StreamCast. Id. As a result, users of any of these platforms
were effectively connected to the same network and were able to exchange files easily. Id.
146. Id. The Gnutella technology is a pure peer-to-peer network. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1034-43.
149. Id. at 1038, 1043.
150. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038, 1041.
151. Id. at 104 1. "If either Defendant closed their doors and deactivated all computers within
their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption." Id.
152. Id. at 1043.
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4. Vicarious Infringement
The Grokster court also addressed the vicarious infringement claim." 3
The Grokster court found that defendants received a financial benefit but
did not have a right to control their users.'54 Unlike Napster, who had the
power to terminate infringing users and had done so, the defendants had
no such ability.' The recording industry argued that the defendants could
modify their system software to prevent or reduce infringement.' 56
However, the Grokstercourt concluded that the defendant's software was
out of their control.' The Grokstercourt reasoned that defendant Grokster
lacked control because it used proprietary software from a third party. 58
The Grokstercourt likewise determined that defendant StreamCast lacked
control, because it used non-proprietary or open source software' and,
thus, no individual entity had control over the source. 6 Without a right to
control, the Grokstercourt concluded that Grokster was also not liable for
"'
vicarious infringement.16
5. Public Policy
The Grokster court acknowledged that the defendants may have
intentionally designed their file sharing systems to avoid indirect copyright
liability.'62 In the meantime, defendants profited from the growth of their
file sharing systems.'63 The Grokster court, however, expressed a
reluctance to expand copyright law without legislative guidance when
technological innovations have changed the landscape of copyright law."6
The Grokster court recognized that Congress is better suited to hear

153. See id. at 1043-46.
154. Id. at 1044-46.
155. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.Defendant Grokster is thus not in control of the source code of its file sharing software
and cannot make changes to the system. See id.
159. Id.
160. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. Defendant StreamCast is not in control of the source
code of its file sharing software and cannot make changes to the system. See id.
161. Id. at 1045-46.
162. See id. at 1046.
163. Id.
164. Id. The instant court also noted that courts must tread lightly in such circumstances. See
id. The instant court further noted that vicarious infringement does not extend just because a
product could be made to be less susceptible to unlawful use, where no control over the user of the
product exists. See id. at 1045-46.
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competing interests on new technology and to make any changes in the
scope of copyright law.'65
6. Disadvantages of Grokster for the RIAA
The recording industry missed the boat with the opportunity to license
the Napster system to distribute music. In the absence of Napster, the pure
P2P Grokster technology became the mainstream method of file sharing.
However, the recording industry could not enjoin the operation of the
Grokster system because of the change to a pure P2P architecture and the
Grokster decision. So, the recording industry cannot force Grokster to
license its copyrighted musical works. Even if the recording industry did
license its music to Grokster, the P2P architecture would not allow for
control over the system. The recording industry needed control to prevent
system users from sharing copyrighted files, and the Napster system had
such control. Now, the recording industry is left with some tough choices.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR THE RECORDING INDUSTRY

The Grokster decision left the recording industry searching for
solutions. One of the first solutions pursued by the industry was to go after
direct infringers. The industry also considered licensing its musical works
to various file distribution services. In the background of all the
controversy and dispute was still the possibility of developing new
technology to fully enforce the copyright laws (self-help measures). Other
possibilities include consumer education and cooperation with universities.
A. Licensing Music to DistributionServices
There are many reasons why it makes sense for the recording industry
to finally and fully license musical works to an Internet distribution service
like Napster, KaZaa, or iTunes (Apple's online music distribution service).
Music consumers have been clamoring for this method of distribution
since Napster and MP3 music compression arrived. This solution would
allow artists to inexpensively distribute their music. Start up costs for new
musical groups would also be lowered. However, the ease of distribution
would come at the expense of recording industry control, which they have
wielded throughout the history of the industry. At this point there may be
no alternative, because consumers have shown that they have a great
affinity for online music distribution and sharing. Consumers are altruistic
165. Grokyter, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
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and want to comply with copyright law given the opportunity. The recent
success of some pay-per-download services reflects this thinking.
1. Apple's iTunes
Apple began iTunes for MacIntosh (Mac) computers in March 2003.166
The iTunes service is a legal music downloading service that has sold over
ten million songs and has actually generated a profit.'67 The service
charges users approximately a dollar per song downloaded. 6 Recently,
iTunes released a version of their downloading software for Windows
computers and more than a million copies were downloaded in the first
three days.69 Other pay-per-download services are following in Apple's
footsteps, including a resurgent Napster. 70
2. The New Napster
Napsterjust launched its legal, pay-per-download service some weeks
ago. 7 ' The cost per download will also be approximately one dollar.'72
Napster will be hoping to tap into the millions of users that have flocked
to the iTunes service along with all other file downloaders who would like
to conduct transactions legitimately and legally and comply with copyright
laws.7 3 Other legal downloading services include MusicMatch, Rhapsody,
and BuyMusic.' 74 However, all these downloading services suffer75from a
failure to provide all available songs because of limited licenses.

3. Limited Licensing
The recording industry has many players and not all are in favor of
online licensing. 76 The result is that each pay-per-download site has an
incomplete selection of music. 1' So, not only does the pay-per-download
music industry have to compete with free sharing services like Grokster
166. Phil Kloer, Napster's Return Part of New Wave of Online Music, Oct. 27, 2003, at
http://www.themauritius.con/article2959.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Kloer, supra note 166.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Kloer, supra note 166.
177. Id.
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(KaZaa), but they have less music to offer. 7 ' This problem is a result of
the recording industry's failure to organize and allow compulsory
licensing for online music download sites. Without such agreements, the
online music selection for pay-per-download sites will never be
complete,' 79 nor will they be able to fully compete with free file sharing
services. 8 The recording industry will probably have to rectify this
situation by developing some sort of compulsory licensing scheme to make
the pay-per-download services competitive in the digital music market. In
the meantime, the recording industry will continue to try to dissuade file
sharing by filing suits against direct copyright infringers.
B. Lawsuits Against Direct Infringers
Beginning in 2003, the RIAA began a campaign to wipe out or
discourage copyrighted file sharing by suing direct infringers.' This
approach is, however, risky at best. The RIAA is essentially suing many
of its own customers.8 2 The result is bad publicity and alienation of the
RIAA's customer base. 8 3 At least some copyrighted file swappers will be
deterred, but there are a great number that will not be. 8 4 Also, there are
many swappers who live in other countries whose governments might not
be vigilant in enforcing copyright laws for online file sharing. 8 5
The RIAA has had difficulty in enforcing subpoenas to find
copyrighted file swappers.18 6 Internet service providers (ISPs) have been
reluctant to give up subscriber information. Without the subscriber
information, the RIAA cannot easily pinpoint who is swapping
copyrighted files. The ISPs are reluctant to give up such information for
fear of alienating their customers and have argued that Digital Millenium
Copyright Act (DMCA) protects them from complying with any such
subpoenas. 8 7 Although ISPs were ordered to comply with the subpoenas,
they are appealing the decision. Several universities have also refused to

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Norman, supra note 28, at 392-96.
182. Id. at 396.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Smith, supra note 18, at *10.
186. Id. at*10-*12.
187. See, e.g., In re Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24,27-30 (D.D.C. 2003). The
DMCA exempts ISPs from liability for copyright infringement for data that passes through the
ISP's system, provided the ISP complies with a number of requirements. Id. at 27.
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comply with RIAA subpoenas, citing administrative rules on student
privacy. Although the courts sided with the universities, campuses are
stepping up ways to reduce copyrighted file sharing by their students. 8 '
Since suits against direct infringers have failed to stop or greatly reduce
copyrighted file sharing, the RIAA might have to take matters into its own
hands.
C. New Protection Technology or Self-Help Measures
The classic method of music distribution, the CD, offers no security or
technological protection from ripping or sharing. The recording industry
has attempted various self-help measures to stop or reduce copyright
infringement, but have failed to come up with any effective universal
solution. Such a solution would be difficult. However, other industries
have resorted to self-help measures with some success. For example, the
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) provides some protection for the
DVD industry. Also, Microsoft limits installation of its XP software on
any PC other than the PC originally purchased with the software installed.
The recording industry will have to consider technological protections
and self-help as part of any licensing agreements. The industry is going to
require that any licensed agents impose some sort of restrictions on the use
of digital music. Otherwise, there will be no protection to keep users from
buying a song for a dollar and sharing it with the world via KaZaa. The
solution will probably be some proprietary compressed file format, like
MP3, that can maintain copyright usage statistics. In order for the
technological protection to work, software developers, like Microsoft, will
have to be made aware of the chosen proprietary file format and write their
media playing or file management software accordingly. Of course, any
protection scheme can and probably will be subverted by hackers.
However, by making the file format proprietary, the recording industry
could probably legally protect against the distribution of hacker software.
However, no one in the Internet community likes proprietary file formats.
A better solution may start with education.
D. Education Campaigns
The RIAA has launched a campaign to educate consumers on the
negative impact that unauthorized file sharing has on the music industry. 8 9

188. See Joni James, Colleges Bar File Sharing Online, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 10, 2003,
availableat http://www.miamni.com/mld/miamiheraId/news/local/6732801.htm (last visited Nov.
24, 2004).
189. Norman, supra note 28, at 403-06.
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The RIAA web site now features anti-piracy quotes from artists
representing a variety of musical genres, including one from rapper
Eminem admonishing infringers. 9 ' A coalition named MUSIC (Music
United for Strong Internet Copyright) also launched an education
campaign to address Internet piracy on September 26, 2002.'9' MUSIC
purchased full-page ads in newspapers to pose the question: "Who Really
Cares About Illegal Downloads?"' 92 Superstars such as Britney Spears and
Elton John supplied the answers.'93 The initial launch was followed by a
series of radio and television spots featuring famous recording artists
speaking out against piracy.'94 In addition, the Copyright Society of the
USA launched Copyright Awareness Week in 2002, a yearly event
directed at school-age children.' 95 The Society offered96teachers handouts
and lesson plans for the week for children of all ages.
1. Do Consumers Know It Is Illegal
A spokesperson behind the consumer education campaign claims, "Our
analysis shows that there's still a significant percentage of people [who do
not] realize it's illegal, and when they do, they are willing to change their
behavior."'

97

The Copyright Society, in turn, believes that young people

know very little about copyright and that asking the public to respect
copyright laws is futile until the public understands and appreciates these
laws.' 98 However, not everyone is convinced that education is a realistic
solution for the recording industry.' 99
2. Ineffective Campaigns
Many consumers must be aware that what they are doing is illegal,
considering the enormous publicity generated by high profile cases like

190. Id. at 403.
191. Press Release, MUSIC Coalition, Music Industry Coalition Launches Educational
Campaignto CombatPiracy,Sept. 26, 2002, availableat http://www.afn.org/pdf/musicunited.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004). The MUSIC coalition consists of numerous industry organizations,
including the performing rights societies, the RIAA, songwriters' associations, and genre-specific
interest groups. See id.
192. Norman, supra note 28, at 403.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Norman, supra note 28, at 403-04.
198. Id.at 404.
199. Id.
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Napster.00 So any effective campaign will have to do more than simply
exhort copyright law. Also, the existing campaign needs to be more
thoughtful and realistic. 20 1 For example, MUSIC's campaign compares
illegal downloading with stealing music from the shelves of a record
store.20 2 This analogy of the tangible world of physical goods to the
intangible world of the Internet may not be persuasive.0 3 A consumer will
not see the similarity between taking a CD from a store and pressing a
button on his computer that downloads a file.204 Thus, any such campaign
that just equates online piracy with shoplifting may be ineffective.2 5
3. Campaign Improvements
Instead, a better thought out campaign might be more effective. 206 For
instance, copyright owners should attempt to educate consumers on the
economics of the music industry which would relate to the consequences
of their file sharing activities.20 7 Also, campaigns should rely less on
famous artists and large corporations to spread the anti-piracy message and
more on lesser known artists, songwriters and independent labels.20 8
Consumers will have a better affinity for the small guy than the multimillionaire artists that they see on MTV's "Cribs." It would be hard for a
consumer to believe that such an artist would miss a few dollars for a song
based on their extravagant lifestyles glamorized on MTV. °9
E. Cooperationwith Higher Education
The whole music file sharing craze really took off first at colleges,
where software innovation met students who possessed a variety of music
on CDs. Because music file sharing began at colleges, it may be the best
starting point for attempting to control or reduce such sharing. The direct
suits may intimidate some students, but university cooperation is essential
to reduce illegal sharing.
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1. Truce
Universities may be in the best position to coordinate or negotiate some
sort of truce with the recording industry.21° Students and industry may have
to realize that some common ground must be met for the mutual love of
music to continue.21 ' The recording industry's amnesty program might be
the first step at that common ground, but at first strike appears a bit
ingenious in implementation."' The program must give true amnesty.
Perhaps a summit between both parties would help.2" 3
2. RIAA's Policemen
Many universities are, however, less than thrilled about becoming the
recording industry's policemen. Last year, the RIAA approached over
2000 university presidents and encouraged them to crack down on music
piracy. 214 Since then, many universities have either threatened students
with honor code sanctions or slowed down Internet connection speeds into
dorm rooms in an effort to deter online piracy.21 5 These actions, however,
have not gone without protest. Educators are becoming "ambivalent about
being forced into the role of intellectual-property police."2 6 They worry
that fear of falling victim to a Napster-like lawsuit may be pushing some
schools to "become so aggressive they're compromising intellectual
freedom on campus. 2 7 As an adjunct professor at the University of
Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, explained, "it creates
a chilling environment when we want to have an environment of openness
and creativity. ' '2t Monitoring is not completely impossible, but it can be
expensive, and its effectiveness is still debatable.2t 9 Most universities still
refuse to monitor students, citing privacy concerns.220

210. See generally Lange, supra note 1.
211. Id.at *19-23.
212. Id. at *23.
213. Id.
214. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Colleges Ambivalent About Anti-Piracy Role, MERCURY NEWS,
Feb. 18, 2003, at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/5205893.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2004).
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3. University Developed Monitoring Software
Nevertheless, several schools have begun programs to monitor and
discourage illegal file sharing. Penn State, Stanford, and others warn
incoming students, as part of orientation, that trading music, films, and
other copyrighted works over the Internet is a crime.22 ' They also provide
serious penalties from revoked network access to student honor code
violations. Detection is made possible by newly developed software. For
instance, the University of Florida (UF) has developed special software
that allows the housing department to detect and stop file sharing among
students in dorms.222 Students caught in the act twice at UF are shut off for
five days from network access.22 3 Those caught a third time lose Internet
privileges indefinitely.224 Over the summer, twelve hundred students were
caught sharing music, movies, or pornography.225
4. Pressplay at Penn State
Perhaps, the best illustration of a cooperative arrangement with
universities is Pressplay's discount contract with Penn State students.2 26
Pressplay executives offered to provide a tailored version of its
subscription service for students along with a discount that would be billed
along with other student fees.227 A company spokesman said, "Offering a
legitimate alternative that provides quality, reliability and the music that
people are looking for is an important element in helping to reduce piracy
' Hopefully this program will be successful.
on campuses."228
IV. CONCLUSION

The recording industry has a tough road to travel down. It won the
early battle against Napster using theories of indirect liability. A
decentralization of the architecture of P2P file sharing networks, however,
resulted in a victory for the online file sharing services in Grokster. The
recording industry passed up a golden opportunity to control the online
music market by fully licensing the Napster technology. Napster had a
221.
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proven product and established user base that would have solidified the
recording industry's position as the first and most formidable distributor
of online music. Somehow Microsoft has never lost its edge as the
dominant supplier of operating systems. Such dominance was initially
established simply by being first to market.
The recording industry must consider several solutions that are not
mutually exclusive. Licensing to online music distributors such as Apple's
iTunes has already begun. However, under this scheme consumers do not
yet have the full selection of music that they would like. Yet, customers
have flocked to the service and iTunes has become profitable. The new
Napster may follow suit.
The recording industry will probably continue bringing suits against
direct infringers. Since they cannot target all swappers, at best they will
discourage some infringers. Still the lawsuits are bad publicity and tend to
alienate the same people who are also customers of the recording industry.
Additionally problematic is that ISPs do not want to cooperate for fear of
alienating their customers.
Technological protections or self-help may be the answer, or at least
part of the answer, for the industry. Any licensing scheme will probably
incorporate some sort of protection. The self-help route is probably more
difficult than other solutions since it requires the cooperation of not only
the entire music industry, but also software developers. However, self-help
has been successful in other industries.
Education of consumers and cooperation with universities could also
be very helpful. However, the current education campaigns could be vastly
improved. Many consumers may not know that what they are doing is
illegal and the full effects of such behavior on the music industry.
University cooperation can bring about a reduction in file sharing through
monitoring software and penalties by school officials. But anytime a music
subscription service, such as Pressplay, directly engages university
officials and students with a special contract, the result is most promising.

